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Consumption largely remains a black box in the population, environment, and 
global change debates. The dominant perspective takes insatiability as axiomatic 
and assumes that reduced consumption will only happen through scarcity or the 
impositions of external authority. Yet humans often exhibit resource limiting behav- 
ior that is not the result of external controls nor is it altruistic or aberrant. This 
article develops the concept of restraint as an evolutionarily and culturally signifi- 
cant behavior, yet one that in modern times has been relegated to a regressive, if 
not trivial, status. The article defines restraint, hypothesizes its historical and evolu- 
tionary roots, lays out the conditions under which it can occur, and develops a 
theoretical parallel to cooperation in international relations theory. 
INTRODUCTION 
The population and environment nexus is becoming increasingly diffi- 
cult to separate from the consumption and environment nexus. Activists 
have criticized the profligacy of western market economies and the waste 
of eastern command economies. International meetings such as the United 
Nations conferences on the environment and development in Rio in 1992 
and on population and development in Cairo in 1994 have emphasized 
consumption along with sustainable development as central to reversing 
trends in environmental degradation. But movement beyond rhetoric has 
been problematic. 
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Analytically, consumption has long been seen as a critical piece in the 
global change puzzle. But it has largely been treated in the aggregate, as a 
variable, for example, in the Ehrlich and Holdren formula, impact equals 
population times affluence times technology (I = PAT). Little attention has 
been paid to consumption, let alone decisions about levels of consump- 
tion, as a distinctive behavior. To be sure, marketing experts scrutinize indi- 
vidual and collective purchasing tendencies. Psychologists in the subfield 
of conservation behavior examine the motives for recycling, park atten- 
dance, and alternative transportation. And economists hold consumption 
as integral to both microeconomic and macroeconomic theory. But all 
these approaches to resource consumption have devoted little analytic at- 
tention, if any, to the behavioral underpinnings of reduced or limited re- 
source consumption. What is more, little effort has been made to concep- 
tualize alternative approaches. 
Consumption or, more to the point, overconsumption, is thus one 
piece of the sustainability puzzle that largely remains a black box. Cer- 
tainly environmentalists, development specialists, and others have identi- 
fied overconsumption as a critical problem. But the dominant perspective 
that informs policymakers and citizens alike is that of economics where 
insatiability is taken as axiomatic, analytically and normatively. In fact, the 
very notion of progress and the belief in unending growth is premised on 
the inevitability and desirability of increasing consumption. For analysts 
and policy makers who do see consumption as a problem, there seems to 
be general agreement that reduced consumption will only happen through 
scarcity or the impositions of external authority. To do this, greed and lack 
of political wil l  must be overcome. In the dominant belief system, if indi- 
viduals and groups actually withhold immediate material consumption, it 
is seen as an oddity, as trivial instances of misguided altruism or hopelessly 
idealistic global citizenship. Such behavior is readily dismissed as the 
quaint habits of Amish farmers, the saintliness of Mother Teresa, or the 
anarchy of deep ecologists. 
In this article, I argue that humans often exhibit resource limiting be- 
havior that is distinct from such altruistic or aberrant behavior and yet, 
from an overall consumption or material throughput perspective, has com- 
parable and potentially larger and more widespread consequences. This 
behavior I call restraint. I contend that restraint in material consumption is 
a distinct and identifiable behavior. What is more, this behavior and the 
conditions that foster it are worth investigating as a complement to exter- 
nally imposed controls on population and regulations of economic activity. 
I begin with the premise that consumers not only make tradeoffs 
among material goods and acquire resources to maximize survivability and 
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reproductive success. But they also deliberately reduce or limit their mate- 
rial consumption in pursuit of nonmaterial benefits. The conditions under 
which they do this are critical, I argue, to both theory and policy aimed at 
ecological and social sustainability. The adaptive significance of restrained 
resource consumption, that is, the deliberate reduction in material benefits 
in exchange for nonmaterial benefits, enters the equation when humans 
shift to relatively sedentary and managed means of resource use. 
This article develops the concept of restraint as an evolutionarily and 
culturally significant behavior, yet one that in modern times has been rele- 
gated to a regressive, if not trivial, sometimes revolutionary, status. To de- 
velop the argument, I define the concept, hypothesize its historical and 
evolutionary roots, and lay out the conditions under which it can occur. 
Finally, I argue that the inattention to restraint is analogous to the inatten- 
tion to cooperation in international relations theory. My aim is to lay 
groundwork for a theory of restraint and for testing it empirically. 
Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish restraint from what 
may appear to be comparable concepts--altruism, cooperation, and con- 
servation. Altruism is self-sacrificing, other-interested behavior whereas re- 
straint, as discussed below, refers to self-interested behavior. Instances of 
restraint can easily be interpreted as altruism but the individual's objectives 
that are of concern here include longterm economic security or the desire 
for group benefits, both of which conform better to a self-interest orienta- 
tion. Although the group, society at large, and the planet as a whole may 
benefit from individuals' restraint, especially where resources are being de- 
pleted and alternatives are few, it does not follow that such individuals 
restrain their consumption for the larger good. Such behavior does occur 
but it is not the behavior I wish to examine. In part, this is because, as Low 
and Heinen (1993) argue from a behavioral ecology perspective, altruistic, 
other-interested behavior is a weak foundation for policy or educational 
goals when large-scale behavioral Change is needed. 
Cooperation and reciprocity are often associated with reduced re- 
source use. But they are best viewed as necessary but not sufficient condi- 
tions for restraint. By themselves, they have no direction: actors can coop- 
erate to conserve or to exploit, to reduce or to increase consumption. In 
international relations study, states are presumed to cooperate when they 
can overcome collective action problems (Olson, 1965) to achieve objec- 
tives mutually beneficial to state interests (Keohane, 1984; Young, 1989). 
International tropical timber trade is almost a perfect example where, 
through the mutual formation of the International Tropical Timber Organi- 
zation, producing and consuming states have cooperated to lower transac- 
tion costs, provide information, and facilitate trade. The problem, of 
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course, is that with all this cooperation virtually none of the timber comes 
from sustainably managed forests (Poore, 1989). Restraint, by contrast, is 
explicit about the direction of resource use practices, denoting reduced or 
limited levels of consumption. 
Conservation comes closest to restraint, especially when it refers to 
managed policies, programs and behaviors designed to limit or reduce the 
use of energy or materials or, say, wildlife. From the policy perspective, 
such conservation includes both formal laws and regulations and informal 
norms, beliefs and expectations. From the psychological perspective, con- 
servation includes those behaviors associated with compliance with these 
formal and informal structures. The goal is less use of energy or materials 
or wildlife. Operational objectives include maintaining or restoring natural 
habitats, reducing dependence on foreign energy supplies, and reducing 
pollution. The desired behavior is individual action where the individual's 
expressed purpose is to use less. The motives can be intrinsic or extrinsic 
or both but the behavior requires both knowledge (generally arising exter- 
nally) and explicit intent. The consumer must know that there is an energy 
problem or a wildlife problem and his or her action is aimed directly and 
solely at that problem. An endangered species policy (an external factor) 
along with environmental education makes the individual aware of and 
concerned about the threatened species. As a result, he or she uses less of 
the species or the habitat and the expressed purpose is to save the species, 
and only that; the purpose is not, for example, to provide for one's own 
needs. 
Restraint is similar to conservation in that it refers to behavior that 
limits resource use. The reasons may also be intrinsic or extrinsic. But re- 
straint is fundamentally associated with self-management, individual or 
collective behavior aimed at developing and maintaining a predictable and 
dependable support system. In its most basic form, restraint is behavior 
integral to survival, it is critical to self-maintenance, provisioning, and self- 
defense. Its enactment, therefore, does not depend on external policies but 
on internal needs, that is, internal to, say, one's household or community 
or organization. Restraint occurs not because others say it is the right thing 
but because the very functioning of one's system requires it. And the effec- 
tiveness of that functioning increases with the compatibility between one's 
immediate environment (physical or social or both) and human actions, 
including restraint (Kaplan, 1983). Moreover, restraint occurs not because 
new, externally provided knowledg e and concerns and incentives make it 
desirable, but because effective participation in one's system makes it im- 
perative. The relevant system may be one's own subsistence farming, the 
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common property management of an inshore fishery, or management of a 
privately owned corporation. 1 
In sum, the concept of restraint directs our analytic attention less to 
programs and external incentives and more to the full range of behaviors 
affecting human-environment interactions (Stern, 1993) and, especially, to 
those essential to survival. Thus, whereas conservation refers to individuals 
wil l ingly and knowingly reducing consumption for the explicit purpose of 
conserving resources, restraint allows for reduction as a by-product of 
other motivations and activities. I can conserve by turning off my lights to 
save energy (or money); I can restrain my use of lights when they give me 
headaches by installing more windows. Restraint is therefore a more di- 
rected concept than altruism, cooperation, or conservation. Its analytic util- 
ity lies in its ability to disentangle these related behaviors to focus more 
directly on that behavior that leads to reduced or limited material resource 
consumption and that draws on human proclivities toward self-manage- 
ment, Iongterm security, and survival. 
RESTRAINTmA DEFINITION 
Restraint in resource consumption refers to an individual's choice to 
deliberately consume less material resources than what is possible in the 
immediate term, given available technologies. The choice of reduced ma- 
terial benefits is governed in part by the expectation of increased non- 
material benefits. If I am the first to take the prey in a group hunt and I wait 
for the others before consuming it, I am exercising restraint. If I crave the 
seed corn or the immature shoots yet refrain from consuming them until 
the crops have matured, I am restraining my consumption. If I decide not 
to develop a parcel of land and instead donate it to the city for a park, I 
have restrained my consumption. If I manufacture a product that is a sus- 
pected carcinogen and unilaterally withdraw it from the market, I have 
exercised restraint. In all cases, I not only consume less of the good than is 
possible, but I expect in return nonmaterial benefits such as group accep- 
tance, reduced uncertainty (including uncertainty over long-run material 
consumption), enhanced personal health, and a reputation for civic mind- 
edness. 
Huastec forestry practices that have endured for centuries illustrate 
some of these characteristics. In a study of a typical Huastec community in 
Mexico, Alcorn and Toledo (1995) found that despite pressures on the 
Huastecs to log their forests and convert all their land to cash cropping and 
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despite the relatively high population density, approximately 
25% of the area is still forested although it could have been 
cleared. People chose not to clear it. The reasons they give for 
their decision to maintain biologically diverse managed forests 
include: commercially valuable products; direct access to prod- 
ucts (firewood, fruits, medicine, construction materials and 
other items having use values); the option value of unknown 
products they may find useful in the future; the superior quality 
of life offered by fresh breezes, shade, clean water and clean 
air; protection of the Earth; and ecological services such as soil 
quality protection, prevention of erosion, and site improvement 
for swidden agriculture (p. 13). 
With this definition and these illustrations in mind, the concept can be 
expanded by considering the sources of restraint, namely, economic calcu- 
lation and social norms. With economic calculation, two behaviors need 
to be distinguished, both of which reduce consumption of a resource in a 
given time period. Substitution refers to the choice of one item over an- 
other; rather than eating one more apple, I choose an orange. In optimiza- 
tion terms, the marginal value of the orange is higher, even though, all told, 
I prefer apples. Relative to eating all apples, therefore, I have "reduced" my 
consumption of apples. From a resource perspective, however, I cannot say 
whether I have placed more or less ecological burden. With the marginal 
choice of the orange, I may certainly consume more resources overall. 
Restraint, by contrast, is behavior that reduces overall consumption in the 
relevant time period. Put differently, it is behavior that reduces immediate 
economic--i .e., material gain-- for immediate or delayed, non-economic 
gain. 
One way to conceive of the difference between substitution and re- 
straint is to view restraint at the opposite end of a continuum from substitu- 
tion (see Figure I). The relevant dimension is material vs nonmaterial bene- 
fits. Points along the continuum represent tradeoff decisions that lead to the 
reduction in the consumption of an item. At the substitution end, the re- 
duction is matched by increased consumption in another item, resulting in 
an ambiguous impact on overall resource use. At the restraint end, the 
reduction is matched by the enhancement of a nonmaterial benefit, result- 
ing in an unambiguous reduction in resource use. 
Pre-management human societies and nonhuman species engage pri- 
marily in the left end, that is, optimal foraging. In resource management 
societies, humans also make material tradeoffs--hence, we see marginal 
decisionmaking as a cornerstone of microeconomic theory. But when hu- 
mans manage themselves and their resource use, they reduce consumption 
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FIGURE 1. Substitution vs restraint. 
Material BENEFITS Non-material 
Substitution TRADEOFFS Restraint 
now to reap rewards later. This, too, is consistent with the logic of micro- 
economics and market behavior (eg., investment and time discounting). 
Restraint enters, and economic reasoning generally departs, when material 
benefits are traded for nonmaterial benefits: social acceptance, self-re- 
liance, economic security, personal health, family wellbeing, political in- 
dependence, a sense of competence and achievement, artistic expression, 
religious and aesthetic experience. 
From a utility theory perspective, the tradeoff associated with restraint 
is rational and, in some sense, "economic." Individuals maximize their util- 
ity by optimally selecting from a basket of material and nonmaterial goods. 
What economic theory tends not to do, however, is to separate the trade- 
offs in this optimization. It tends to see all goods as substitutable and all 
tradeoffs as possible, subject to budget and institutional constraints. More- 
over, for policy purposes, the uses of economic reasoning tend to empha- 
size the material. Growth in measurable benefits, that is, material goods, 
prevails in policy making at all levels of industrial and industrializing soci- 
eties. To be sure, the economic development literature tries to incorporate 
nonmaterial values. But, in practice, the logic is generally the same: in- 
creases in material wealth are necessary before increases in other bene- 
f its--"leisure" or a safe work place or a clean environment--can be real- 
ized. 
By contrast, my emphasis on reduced material consumption in ex- 
change for nonmaterial benefits attempts to capture a range of behaviors 
that do not follow the prevailing logic. People do volunteer their labor, 
organize their communities, serve their country in the military, and donate 
to charities whether or not they have achieved high levels of income and 
whether or not they expect future material rewards. Restraint, as defined 
here, is precisely that choice of non-material over material goods, in both 
the near and far term. Put differently, it is that choice whereby the ef fec t  is 
to elevate non-resource consuming activities above resource consuming 
activities. From an ecological and, ultimately, social perspective, resource 
consumption that falls within regenerative and assimilative capacities is a 
superior form of consumption. Contrary to the prevailing economic reason- 
ing, not all consumption is alike and certainly infinitely increasing rates of 
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material consumption are thermodynamically and ecologically impossible 
(Ehrlich, Ehrlich, & Holdren, 1993; Georgescu-Roegen, 1993). 
One might argue that even here, such restraint leads to future material 
consumption, much as investment does. But the point here is that invest- 
ment for future consumption does not capture all observed behavior, espe- 
cially that relevant to reduced or limited consumption. Investment, as used 
in economic accounting, ignores the material/nonmaterial tradeoff humans 
make and, as is well known, it ignores ecological impacts. The mechanism 
of restraint, unlike substitution and investment, raises questions not gener- 
ally raised in the economic, business, or even environmental communities. 
As such, it is policy relevant because it offers opportunities for adaptation 
to contemporary problems different from those typically coming out of the 
policy community, that is, recommendations to adjust current patterns of 
consumption. Restraint directs analytic and policymaking attention away 
from, say, environmental protection and preservation and the greening of 
industry, and toward those conditions that foster nonmaterial "consump- 
tion." The analytic challenge, consequently, is to identify those conditions 
under which this subset of behavior is dominant, not subsidiary, as in the 
contemporary political economy. I return to some of these conditions be- 
low after considering the second way restraint can be driven, namely, so- 
cial norms. 
In contrast with economic choices, social norms show the most prom- 
ise of durable adaptation over the long term, both psychologically and 
institutionally (De Young, 1993; Katsev & Johnson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990; 
Young, 1989). Absent crisis, they may also be the most difficult to impleq 
ment in the face of a dominant belief system--namely, technologically 
driven economic growth. 
Socially, an individual who demonstrates restraint sends a signal to 
others that he or she is committed to the group. This is especially true in 
small, tightly integrated groups. If I restrain my overall consumption, more 
is available for others. Through restraint, I can develop a reputation for 
cooperation, assuring others that group participation is rewarded. Also, 
with such a reputation, monitoring and enforcement within the group are 
easier. This both strengthens group activity and allows for increased indi- 
vidual autonomy because elaborate control mechanisms are not needed. 
When reputations develop around a mutually rewarding behavior like 
restraint, that behavior becomes a norm. Through cultural adaptation, the 
norm of restraint provides individuals a clear and easily used vehicle for 
demonstrating group loyalty and dependability. And restraint as a norm is 
particularly easy to employ because the individual need only refrain from 
doing something. Of course, it is this very ease of use (not doing some- 
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thing) that makes it difficult for outsiders to observe which may explain in 
part why it has received so little analytic attention. 2 
Strictly speaking, of course, restraint is difficult to observe. But from 
the perspective of Iongterm resource management, the behavior can be 
interpreted as a substitute for effective feedback between the resource and 
its consumption. As discussed below, because feedback in a managed re- 
source system entails temporal lags and spacial distances far greater than 
that in a nonmanaged system, surrogate behaviors will evolve from preex- 
isting behaviors. Visible, clearly communicated restraint may be one such 
behavior. It is fundamentally conservative with respect to pushing the re- 
source beyond regeneration when feedback is ineffective. 
THE EVOLUTION OF RESTRAINT--AN HYPOTHESIS 
From an evolutionary perspective, a tradeoff between material and 
nonmaterial benefits may enhance individual survival and reproduction 
and thus will be selected for. To demonstrate an evolutionary (genetic and 
cultural) basis for restraint in resource consumption, it is necessary to iden- 
tify precursors and trace adaptations from hunter/gatherer societies through 
contemporary industrial and post-industrial societies. The following posits 
how that history might have occurred where each proposition is intended 
only as a testable hypothesis. 
Hunter/gatherers exercise restraint with respect to members of their 
group. They restrain their aggressive/defensive tendencies and they restrain 
their consumption of resources when others participate in the acquisition 
of those resources and when group cohesion depends on the sharing of 
those resources. This can be considered a limited form of resource restraint 
as it can be relaxed whenever there is abundance. Also, it is not a very 
demanding form of restraint because it has immediate feedback mecha- 
nisms. Investment in a group hunt, for example, leads to immediate re- 
wards for the individual and kin. An occasional solo hunt would confirm 
the advantages of group hunting and, concomitantly, individual restraint, at 
least enough to keep the group together. This kind of restraint also is lim- 
ited because it need be exercised no further than the group, certainly not 
extended to the environment. Thus, if a given resource is exhausted, the 
group merely moves on to the next. It is the inability or unwillingness to 
move on, however, that contributes to the transition to agriculture and to 
selective pressures for extended forms of restraint. 
With agriculture and, eventually, industry, restraint must be extended 
over time. Seeds must be saved, shoots and fruits must be allowed to ma- 
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ture. Restraint becomes adaptive because the inherent time lags between 
the initial investment of effort and materials and the eventual consumption 
of the output weakens the feedback from the resource and its regenerative 
capacity, on the one hand, and to patterns of resource use, on the other. 
Successful adaptations in the transition from hunter/gatherer to agriculture 
were likely to be those that 1) restored or recreated effective feedback 
mechanisms; and 2) built on previously successful behaviors, including so- 
cial and resource restraint. One strategy would likely have been group or 
collective management. 
That is, successful adaptation would have been, first, to forego the 
immediacy of returns on investment (i.e., until harvest) i f  members of the 
group could be assured others in the group would so restrain their use. The 
assurance problem (Runge, 1992) thus becomes a driving force in the shift 
from hunter/gatherer to agricultural society. Its resolution may have pro- 
vided the critical replacement for resource feedback. This hypothesis sug- 
gests that successful solvers of this problem were those groups who devel- 
oped two strategies: 
1) Group-based, self-management mechanisms that more-or-less corre- 
spond to principles of effective common property management as delin- 
eated by Ostrom (1990). 
These principles show how local sustainable use can occur. Ostrom's 
eight principles are: clearly defined boundaries, congruence between the 
rules of resource use and local conditions, participation by the users in 
changing the rules, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution 
mechanisms, rights to organize, and organization of all activities within a 
larger institutional context. 
2) Self-defense mechanisms that not only draw boundaries around re- 
sources and exclude others but also internalize benefits, externalize costs, 
and open others" resource boundaries. 
These mechanisms can account in part for the success in material and 
power terms of some societies and of some members of societies--eg., 
imperialists, colonialists, pioneers, traders, transnational capitalists--and 
the relative failure of others. These mechanisms account for both self-man- 
agement and environmental degradation through cost externalization and 
the creation of open-access property regimes (Bromley, 1992; The Ecolo- 
gist, 1992). From a Iongterm perspective, however, such success may be 
only short term since they depend on unending increases in throughput 
and on technological innovation to handle all problems that result (Daly & 
Cobb, 1989; Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1990; Meadows, Meadows, & Randers, 
1992; Pirages, 1989). In other words, these mechanisms point to the unsus- 
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tainability of many such strategies when resources are exhausted and waste 
sinks fi l led--i.e., the conditions of global ecological crisis. 3 
For prescriptive purposes, therefore, strategies 1) and 2) can help ex- 
plain both durable resource use and environmental degradation. The two 
strategies can also suggest the kind of adaptation in consumption behavior 
needed to reverse the trends in this crisis. That is, they suggest how adapta- 
tion of existing behavioral tendencies, as opposed to creating evolu- 
tionarily novel ones (Low & Heinen, 1993), can take place. 
One adaptation, put simply, is to draw boundaries around critical re- 
sources, exclude others, and defend against intrusions--what I will call 
resistance. Such an adaptation enables groups to resist temptations, espe- 
cially those that entail what can be characterized as asymmetrical and 
Faustian bargains. When a transnational timber company negotiates with a 
group of forest peoples, the bargain is asymmetrical in the information, 
technology, and economic alternative to agreement held by each of the 
parties. When a hazardous waste shipper contracts with a desperately poor 
farmer to store barrels of unknown chemical mixtures, the bargain over 
time and across generations is Faustian. Resistance thus serves as a coun- 
terweight, or counterstrategy, to the attempts of others to employ the sec- 
ond strategy, namely, cost externalization and the opening of other's 
boundaries. It is, of course, true that few groups in the last several centuries 
have been successful in simultaneously managing their resources and re- 
sisting the intrusions of others, especially when those intrusions are accom- 
panied by force and the promises of great wealth. In recent years, however, 
examples of such efforts appear to have increased. Successful groups ap- 
pear to be those who not only resist locally but establish political linkages 
internationally. Indigenous peoples have blocked dams and logging opera- 
tions while international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and inter- 
governmental organizations have put pressure on governmental and pri- 
vate funders (Korten, 1990; Rich, 1994). In general, the analytic and 
communicative skills of peoples at all levels of society worldwide are in- 
creasing (Rosenau, 1990) and transnational linkages are enabling previ- 
ously exploited peoples to manage their own resources (Princen & Finger, 
1994). 
The important analytic point, however, is that these efforts are distin- 
guished from political or religious resistance. They are not mass rebellion 
against a dominant authority nor are they localized efforts to exclude the 
outsider. Rather, as a resource management adaptation, these efforts neces- 
sarily compel the resource users to restrain the use of their own resource. 
Users cannot risk pushing the resource beyond its regenerative capacity 
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because the success of the adaptation depends not on cost externalization 
or on opening others' boundaries, but on managing one's own resource. 
That resource thus becomes "close," just as all things do that we are highly 
dependent on--parents, children, job (if alternatives are few), neighbors (if 
there is a sense of community), car (if rare or restored). The resource being 
closer, we are risk averse in its exploitation. As a result, we build in a 
cushion against lean times. We encourage organizational and managerial 
buffer through our group's internal self-organization and through our influ- 
ence on the external institutional environment. 4 
In short, through self management we resist intrusions into our re- 
source and restrain our use to allow for the unpredictable and the variable, 
for the low probability, yet high cost event. Put differently, the nonmarket, 
nonmaterial value of resource dependability and security over time over- 
shadows the potential short-term, material gains. Discount rates for my 
own, self-managed resource are low. By contrast, my discount rate for your 
group's resource is relatively high. All else equal, if you give me access, 
even at a supposedly "fair" price, I am more likely to degrade it than you 
are. Restraint and resistance are key behaviors, therefore, in a sustainable 
economy. With this hypothesis of an evolutionary basis to restraint and the 
choices of self-management and resistance as strategies, I now turn to the 
conditions for actually promoting such behavior. 
SUFFICIENCY AND THE CONDIT IONS FOR RESTRAINT 
Many societies define progress as increasing material consumption 
(Figure 2). The notion has intuitive appeal because, as individuals, we do 
consume more as we grow larger and, as societies, we consume more as 
we collectively provide our necessities and self-defense. The notion also 
has an evolutionary or adaptive appeal as it is well established that pre- 
literate humans and nonhuman species enjoy reproductive success when 
they acquire more resources, even if those resources only contribute to 
status and prestige (Low & Heinen, 1993). 
In a world of unlimited resource availabil ity and waste sink capacity, 
this notion has been not only intuitively and adaptively plausible, it has 
been a driving force in industrialization, (:apitalist and socialist, and ex- 
panding markets generally (Daly, 1991). For many practical purposes, such 
a world did exist. There was always a frontier. One could extract resources 
and dump wastes and no one (or no one of consequence to the extractors 
and dumpers) bore the burden. 
It is now well known that, for most practical purposes, such a world 
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FIGURE 2. Progress as increasing consumption. 
consumption/t 
no longer exists. But what is generally not widely recognized, and what 
may be a more important observation from a sustainability perspective, is 
that, because ecological constraint has existed side-by-side with the fron- 
tier, humans have long dealt with, and adapted to, resource limits. As a 
consequence they have developed mechanisms, mostly through cultural 
evolution, to restrain their resource use, as hypothesized above. Restraint is 
not, in other words, an evolutionarily novel behavior. It may have been 
relegated to an inferior status when progress was defined in terms of in- 
creasing material consumption. But it is at least as "natural" in post-hunter/ 
gatherer societies as unbridled consumption. 
To set the conditions for restraint, I put the concept in the larger con- 
text of sufficiency, that is, the point at which a resource user decides that a 
level of consumption is enough. Sufficiency does not define a sustainable 
level of resource use. It can, however, be a target for policy makers and 
collective resource users. The premise here is that if sustainable levels have 
to be calculated and then enforced through external incentives, both the 
complexity of the task and the unlikelihood of its implementation will ren- 
der the goal of sustainability unachievable. Sufficiency as a target or direc- 
tion has, I argue, a better chance of adoption at the individual, group, and, 
eventually, societal levels. 
Sufficiency 
Decision makers, whether as individuals or as organized collectivities, 
strive to increase material consumption over an initial period. Children eat 
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FIGURE 3. Sufficiency. 
consumption/t 
sufficiency point 
more and more food and industrializing countries burn more and more 
fossil fuels. For some decisionmakers and for some resources, such con- 
sumption eventually levels off or even drops. This turning point may be 
due to a simple inability to consume at higher rates (obese people cannot 
increase their rate forever) or to better returns from the consumption of an 
alternative resource (from coal to natural gas, for example). 
The turning point may also be due to a decision to pursue a non- 
material benefit. I will call this a sufficiency point (see Figure 3). If the full- 
grown youth refuses the next increment of food consumption and instead 
chooses an additional increment of music practice, that individual has 
reached sufficiency in food consumption. If a nation decides to forego the 
next level of consumer goods to increase taxes and train its citizenry in civil 
defense, that society has reached a sufficiency point in consumer goods. 
In principle, if sufficiency is reached on all critical resources and the 
associated level is regenerative, a sustainable economy is achieved. But I 
take as axiomatic that sustainability can only be a high-level goal. To be 
operational, objectives must be identified and their behavioral assumptions 
made explicit. Sustainability is the general goal, then, and sufficiency the 
objective (Lele, 1991). Sufficiency, restraint, self-management, and resis- 
tance provide the behavioral underpinnings, then, of policies and institu- 
tional mechanisms aimed at sustainability..What, then, are the conditions 
that encourage such behaviors? 
Conditions 
Restraint is the behavior that determines the sufficiency point and that 
maintains the reduced level of consumption over time. It is a function of 
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two sets of factors, the first of which includes information, innate or 
learned preferences, and external incentives. Although these capture many 
popular approaches to environmental problems, they also appear least 
amenable to effective policy interventions to reduce consumption. 
Lack of information regarding environmental impacts underlies the ra- 
tionale for much of environmental education, formal and informal. Exam- 
ples of successful environmental policies resulting from enhanced environ- 
mental awareness include the U.S. bans on DDT and PCBs (owing largely 
to Rachel Carson's Silent Spring) and reduced CFC production after con- 
sumer rejection of household aerosols (owing largely to an intense media 
campaign). Despite these and other successes, many in the environmental 
movement now believe that more information and improved public aware- 
ness is not enough to arrest current trends. Soil erosion and rainforest de- 
struction are well documented and well known, including by those who 
contribute to such destruction, but the trends continue (Colchester & Loh- 
man, 1993; Myers, 1993; Brown, Lenssen, & Kane, 1995). 
Preference for nonmaterial goods can be learned which suggests ave- 
nues for intervention. But as with public awareness, individual attitude 
change is difficult, slow, and sensitive to exogenous shocks, especially an 
opportunity for new-found wealth or a possibility that personal wealth will 
decline. It is also doubtful that effective attitude change programs can be 
implemented on a global basis and in time to deal with urgent problems. 
This is especially true where major segments of a society live at a subsis- 
tence level. 
External incentives include economic and religious factors. Economic 
incentives can lead to behavior change but the effects of tax credits and 
pollution fines often do not last. When the incentive is removed, previous 
behaviors tend to recur, all else equal (De Young, 1993; Katsev & Johnson, 
1987). Religious sanction may be more long-lasting but the impact minor. 
Pope John Paul II's anti-consumerist calls are probably heeded, if at all, 
only by the clergy and a few devout, obedient, and economically secure 
Catholics. s 
Information, learning, and external incentives all play a part in an 
overall social change process aimed at sustainability. But they all fly in the 
face of powerful social forces, especially those that champion economic 
growth and material consumption. Moreover, as practiced, environmental 
education, environmental policymaking, ai~d the economic stance of major 
religions all tend to support, even promote, such forces. Environmental 
education dwells on nature appreciation, environmental policies empha- 
size end-of-the-pipe remediation and clean-up, and religions support the 
economic policies and the hoped-for prosperity and support of their host 
states. 
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Despite my cursory treatment and possibly facile dismissal of this first 
set of factors, it does appear that they have significant weaknesses and that 
examination of factors more directly tied to economic choices and ecologi- 
cal constraints is necessary. The second set of factors thus includes ecologi- 
cal feedback, institutional arrangements, and economic security. 
Ecological feedback refers to the negative signals an organism receives 
when it disturbs its environment. Such feedback leads to changed behav- 
ior, at least in the short term. With respect to resource use, when the feed- 
back tells the organism that depletion is imminent, it finds alternative re- 
sources via extended foraging or migrat ion. Humans also pursue 
technology innovation and modify their behavior by, for example, adopting 
soil conservation methods when crop yields decline. If such feedback is 
interrupted or cannot be assimilated or is subject to collective action prob- 
lems (i.e., an inability to overcome individual incentives to achieve collec- 
tive benefits), the behavior is unlikely to change and the resource is likely 
to be pushed to depletion. 
Effective feedback from one's resource consuming behavior to that be- 
havior's environmental impact is a precondition for restraint. Education, 
coercion, and incentive systems are not necessary to restrain resource con- 
sumption when clear signals are coming from the resource itself and when, 
as a result, those signals portend risks to the user's wealth or economic 
security or survival. Self-interest, although not the only motivator, remains 
the most powerful. 
Institutional arrangements leading to restraint have both endogenous 
and exogenous components. Resource management schemes in both pri- 
vate and common property regimes (and, for that matter, state property 
regimes) are typically successful only when users can draw boundaries 
around the resource and exclude others, as discussed. To do this, an exter- 
nal political environment that ensures those property rights and, hence, the 
longterm flow of benefits, is necessary. Here is where policy interventions 
are most likely to be effective. The implied policies would put a priority on 
secure property rights, whether private, common or state held, rather than 
on opening markets, subsidizing transportation, and promoting privatiza- 
tion and deregulation. 
Economic security complements institutional arrangements. Studies of 
soil erosion and conservation find that farmers worldwide will knowingly 
overuse their land when prices are highly uncertain, when market condi- 
tions create extreme competition, or when suppliers and buyers have sig- 
nificant market power. Control over these factors increases as farmers form 
cooperatives, sell their products directly to consumers, generate their own 
fertilizers, develop their own pest controls, and increase their household 
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self-reliance (Dahlberg, 1993; Kneen, 1989). All these self-management 
measures increase economic security and, as a secondary effect, entail less 
production per acre. This, then, is restraint motivated not by enhanced 
information or guilt or external incentives but by the pursuit of self-interest 
in a non-material value--economic security--rather than a material value 
which necessitates ever-increasing material use. 
Of the several conditions for restraint, those grounded in self-interest 
and economic security appear to offer the most promise. From a prescrip- 
tive perspective, they exploit existing behavioral patterns, not evolu- 
tionarily novel ones, to promote reduced or limited resource consumption. 
On the face of it, however, self-interest and economic security may appear 
to be behaviors contradictory to the goal of reduced consumption. The 
apparent contradiction, however, is analogous to what international rela- 
tions theorists have done to explain cooperation. 
PARADIGMATIC SHIFT: FROM REDUCED CONSUMPTION 
TO RESTRAINT IN CONSUMPTION 
The long-standing dichotomy between realism and idealism in inter- 
national relations theory has existed in part because realism could not ac- 
count for cooperation among self-interested states. The theoretical ad- 
vances of Axelrod (1984), Oye (1986), Keohane (1984) and others was to 
employ the same behavioral assumptions of realists and, through logic and 
stylized games, get cooperation. 
In the environmental realm, a parallel dichotomy has existed, that be- 
tween what I will call consumerism and environmentalism (see Figure 4). 6 
Consumerism is part of two dominant theoretical approaches to human 
and nonhuman behavior, namely economics and behavioral ecology. Sig- 
nificant strands of thought within political science, anthropology, sociology 
and other disciplines are influenced by this paradigm. 
Consumerism holds that individuals will maximize their utility or sur- 
vivability and reproductive success by optimally choosing among an array 
of resources. Investment of time and possessed resources is aimed at the 
maximization of present and future resource consumption. Variations allow 
FIGURE 4. The realist-consumerist parallel. 
Realism vs Idealism --- Cooperation 
Consumerism vs Environmentalism ~ Restraint 
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for reduction in uncertainty as a primary goal. But, in general, these ap- 
proaches emphasize the consumption of resources. Other goals such as 
self-esteem or community or spirituality or even economic security (as op- 
posed to economic wealth) are relegated to the black box of "util ity" or to 
other disciplines such as psychology. 
In these models of behavior, the only reason to withhold consumption 
of one item is to increase the consumption of another. Substitution fits but 
restraint in overall material resource consumption is out of the realm of the 
consumerist paradigm. And in applied settings, restraint is not only out of 
the realm of the dominant paradigm, it is anathema to certain tenets of 
modern life, namely growth, efficiency, specialization, mobility, and com- 
petition. As I have argued, however, restraint is not a novel behavior. In 
industrial and post-industrial societies, it only has been relegated to the 
ascetic, the fringe, or the quaint. In contrast to consumerism, environmen- 
talism holds that, by consuming minimally, consumers will (or should) in- 
crease their satisfaction and ensure the Iongterm survivability of their soci- 
ety and the planet. Protecting natural areas, recycling, and using mass 
transit are activities consistent with this paradigm. 
The parallels between the realist/idealist dichotomy and the consumer- 
ist/environmentalist dichotomy are several. Realism and consumerism em- 
phasize self-interest, individualism, short-term calculation, and rational 
choice. Idealism and environmentalism emphasize other-interestedness, 
social goals, and Iongterm calculation. Moreover, just as realism could not 
explain extant cooperation among self-interested actors, consumerism can- 
not explain extant restraint in resource consumption. Similarly, just as 
idealism cannot explain cooperation without resort to normative arguments 
(one should cooperate for the greater good, we must cooperate to ensure 
peace), environmentalism cannot explain restraint without comparable re- 
sort (one must consume less of the Earth's resources, we must cooperate to 
overcome our greedy tendencies). 
The realist/idealist dichotomy was resolved by focussing on coopera- 
tion. Under certain conditions such as repeated plays and a long shadow 
of the future, egoistic actors could rationally cooperate not because they 
converted to peace-loving, global citizens but because it was in their own 
self-interest; their national security, for example, would be enhanced. Sim- 
ilarly, then, we need not demand or expect consumers to convert to envi- 
ronmentalism. Rather, under certain conditions, some of which are posited 
above, these materially growth-oriented individuals will find it in their own 
self-interest to restrain their material consumption as a means of attaining 
higher nonmaterial goals, one of which is economic security. 
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In sum, a focus on material restraint rather than on environmental 
conversion has parallels with the international relations community's focus 
on cooperation rather than on, say, hegemonic stability, international law, 
or international organization. That community's conceptual advance has 
led to policy prescriptions that do not rely on the diminution of national 
security concerns or on the promise of some form of world government. 
Similarly, the sustainability community needs concepts to build and adapt 
existing human behaviors and the institutions that support them. Such con- 
cepts might include restraint, self-management, resistance and sufficiency. 
ADVANTAGES OF THE FOCUS ON RESTRAINT 
The concept of restraint, as opposed to cooperation, efficiency seek- 
ing, recycling and other behaviors generally assumed necessary to reverse 
environmental degradation, has several advantages for addressing critical 
environmental issues. 
1) It makes explicit the ecological difference between material and 
nonmaterial consumption. From a conventional economic perspective, all 
goods, material and nonmaterial, are substitutable. From an ecological per- 
spective, substitutability cannot be assumed when the resource is an aqui- 
fer, a layer of topsoil, a degree of biodiversity that allows for regeneration, 
a stratospheric layer of ozone that shields all life from ultraviolet (UV) radi- 
ation, or an entire atmosphere that moderates climate. At the same time 
that the concept of restraint distinguishes material and nonmaterial con- 
sumption, it does not preclude tradeoffs. It merely helps direct our atten- 
tion to those tradeoffs that have either near-term or Iongterm effects. 
2.) Restraint does not assume that individuals will, contrary to their 
evolutionary history, adopt a very Iongterm--i.e., ecologically Iongterm-- 
perspective. It merely assumes that humans will restrain their near-term 
consumption in exchange for (relatively) near-term nonmaterial benefits. In 
so doing, the reduced consumption decreases the likelihood of ecological 
overshoot. It has a Iongterm effect, yet not because practitioners become 
global citizens or because they adopt extremely low discount rates. Rather, 
they seek other values, including that nebulous, but powerfully motivating, 
"sense of security" by reducing consumption. As a consequence, in the 
aggregate and over time, the effect is, indeed, to reduce a society's con- 
sumption. 
3) At the individual level, restraint implies a potentially positive trade- 
off between material and nonmaterial goods. The environmentalist call for 
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reduced consumption, by contrast, implies a reduction in satisfaction in 
exchange for some ill-defined, possibly unreachable general goal of, say, 
planetary salvation. What is more, from a collective action perspective, 
reduced consumption is readily seen by the individual (or any unit includ- 
ing states) as the sucker's pay-off in a multiperson, Prisoner's Dilemma. 
4) At the organizational level, restraint is more consistent with the 
resource implications of self-organization and self-governance. Ostrom 
(1990), Bromley (1992) and others, for example, have found that common 
pool resources can be successfully managed for decades, even centuries, 
when certain conditions are met by self-organizing, self-managing groups 
of resource users. This resource behavior is not well captured by altruism 
or conservation. Cooperation is insufficient as well because other organiza- 
tions--transnational corporations, the World Bank, and so forth--are also 
very cooperative but it is cooperation to increase consumption, not limit it. 
Restraint best captures the specific behavior of the self-organized common 
pool users because the users themselves agree to use less than they would 
individually want and agree to self-imposed monitoring and penalties. 
5) At the collective, societal level, a focus on restraint encourages the 
intervenor and the policy maker to look for mechanisms that reward non- 
material activities. These may include participation in community-based 
education and policing, self-reliance by producing one's own shelter and 
food, and voluntary service at the community, national or international 
levels. Such activities are widely seen to strengthen communities at many 
levels. Yet policy makers need justification to promote such activities be- 
cause they contradict commercial and employment policies aimed at eco- 
nomic growth for which increased consumption is integral. Restraint offers 
these decision makers a recognizable but non-altruistic alternative. 
6) Restraint may be the only behavior that provides the necessary eco- 
logical feedback between resource consumption patterns on the one hand, 
and resource regenerative and assimilative capacity on the other. Human 
societies have created so much distance between production and con- 
sumption decisions that it is virtually impossible to relate one's individual 
decisions to collective and environmental impacts. On cognitive grounds, 
we cannot possibly collect and process the necessary information. And on 
ethical grounds, we cannot assume responsibility for a host of decisions 
that, for example, bring grapes and flowers from Chile to North American 
supermarkets in winter. 7 Restraint compels individuals and societies to re- 
duce that distance, increasing the likelihood that consumption decisions 




1. Restraint within a private, profit-making, growth-oriented corporation may appear contra- 
dictory. But as economist Robert Heilbroner (1956) stresses in his history of industrial 
development and the desire for gain, one of the great paradoxes of capitalism is that the 
capitalist must be thrifty. Unlike all previous means of acquiring wealth (conquest and 
marriage, primarily) the capitalist does not indulge himself with his newfound riches, but 
reinvests it to generate yet more wealth. 
2. The other major reason is that it contradicts a fundamental tenet of modern, industrial 
society--growth, especially growth in material goods. 
3. By "global" I do not mean strictly those issues that span the planet, i.e., global warming, 
ozone depletion, and loss of biodiversity. Rather, I refer to those issues for which dis- 
placement of costs across media and over time and space are no longer tenable for both 
ecological and social reasons. 
4. Evidence of such buffers can be found in the common property regime literature (eg., 
Bromley, 1992; Ostrom, 1989) although they are often referred to as "inefficiencies." In 
fact, what from an outsider's perspective appears to be inefficiencies is, from inside a 
successfully managed commons, often a useful and necessary cushion (personal commu- 
nication, Fikrets Birkes, 1995). 
5. This is not to say that the pope and other religious figures are not important shapers of 
public opinion. But in the face of mass advertising and the reverence for consumption 
and entertainment that prevails among so many in the U.S. and elsewhere, it is doubtful 
that on this count they have had much influence. 
6. Both these terms, consumerism and environmentalism, are somewhat unfortunate be- 
cause they are widely used in other contexts. Consumerism often refers to the movement 
among consumers to expose shoddy goods and improve consumers' decision making. 
Environmentalism usually refers to the entire set of movements from nature protection to 
pollution control to sustainable development. Although the terms have these other conno- 
tations, I choose them in lieu of creating terms de novo. Their analytic utility rests on the 
precision of the definitions, their consistency of use, and, most important, the extent to 
which they offer new conceptual perspectives. 
7. LaRue Hosmer, personal communication, 1994. 
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